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Abstract
Insofar as Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s writings deal with political statements, they are evident; yet insofar
as they deal with scientific issues, they are misleading. If applied to the concrete implementation of science,
such as distribution of research funds and (peer) review, they would seriously impede progress.
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There is little doubt that Sir Karl Raimund Popper is one of the most prominent figures in the
philosophy of science of the past century. Many people, from politicians to scientists, pay lip
service to his theses, and numerous television shows, conferences and books have been organized
in his honour. But while Sir Karl Raimund Popper has emphasized a lot of things which are
undoubtedly important, his thoughts about the induction problem [1], his criterion of demarcation
between science and “pseudo-science,” at least if taken naively and at face value, may be an
impediment to scientific research programs, thereby resulting in a waste of efforts and money.
In what follows, I shall begin with a few brief remarks on his views on politics and his criti-
cism of psychoanalysis. The main subject of this article is a critical review of Sir Karl Raimund
Popper’s “solutions to the problems of induction” and its consequences for the public understand-
ing of science. Concrete implementations of these “solutions” may severely hamper the scientific
progress by imposing too heavy and detrimental criteria on science proper. Finally, I shall try to
discuss the question of why Sir Karl Raimund Popper is so highly honoured in certain circles;
mainly in politics and in the natural sciences.
Most of what I say here has already been expressed many times by philosophers of science
such as, for example, Imre Lakatos [2] or Paul Feyerabend [3, 4]. But many of these critical is-
sues are not mentioned in the almost frenetic, uncritical appraisals and reviews of the work of Sir
Karl Raimund Popper which accompany the 100 anniversary of his birthday here in Vienna and
elsewhere. There are, however, some notable exceptions. Asher Peres has criticised a Gedanken-
experiment devised by the late Sir Karl Raimund Popper to “falsify” the dominant Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics [5]. Marisa Dalla Chiara has given a critical account of Sir
Karl Raimund Popper’s disapproval of quantum logic [6], in particular the approach chosen by
Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann [7].
Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s thinking was deeply rooted in the spiritual life of post-World War I
Vienna in many ways. He first felt attracted by some major schools of thought which flourished in
or even originated from this city, but afterwards became one of their strongest opponents. (Stated
polemically, no school of thought should be eager to have Sir Karl Raimund Popper as a disciple.)
Having been a Marxist, he disguised Marxism as a metaphysical, nonscientific ideology which
brings misery to the masses. Indeed, this fact must have appeared rather obvious, in particular
at the end of the World War II, given the developments in the Bolshevik dominated Soviet block
under Stalin. The same holds true for a criticism of Nazism and its various totalitarian conser-
vative offsprings, also in Austria before the German invasion. Undemocratic ideologies had just
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rampaged through Europe and the Pacific. (I personally think that, in view of the atrocities and
inhumanities committed, a lack of falsifiability is one of the less malign deficiencies of these kinds
of totalitarianism.)
Back in his old Vienna days, Sir Karl Raimund Popper also became fascinated by the psycho-
analytic theories of Freud and Adler, under whose aegis he engaged briefly in social work with
children. He later on denounced the psychoanalytic theory as nonscientific and useless, mainly
because it appeared to him to be difficult to falsify (or if falsifiable, had been falsified). This shock
struck the psychoanalytic community, in particular its academic sections, hard. I still remember
joint sessions of the two main Vienna psychoanalytic societies a couple of years ago, which tried
to cope with this criticism, which at that time had been mainly put forward by Adolf Gru¨nbaum
[8]. It is not too unjustified to claim that Sir Karl Raimund Popper managed to academically
discredit psychoanalysis up to this date, at least what its influence in the academic world is con-
cerned. In academic psychology, phenomenologically oriented and “falsifyable” theories such
as behaviorism flourished; which were “scientifically sound” and reasonable according to Sir Karl
Raimund Popper’s criterion of demarcation. I have strong doubts that practical clinical psychology
has benefited from this climate of thought. On the contrary, my feeling is that this development
has hampered or even stopped in-depth, sustainable, treatments and cures of mental illnesses of
epidemic proportions such as depression and neurosis.
Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s main contribution to the philosophy of science has been his “so-
lutions to the problems of induction.” This was conceived against another Viennese invention:
against the “verification principle” of the Vienna Circle (which included Moritz Schlick, Rudolf
Carnap, Otto Neurath, Viktor Kraft, Hans Hahn, and Herbert Feigl). He turned the verification
principle upside down and introduced a “falsification principle” as a demarcation criterion be-
tween science proper or “quasi-science,” or, as he sarcastically used to called it, “blablabla.”
While it is quite obvious that no operational verification can ever prove a scientific theory
to be “true,” it is not totally clear why a necessary criterion for any thought to be considered
scientific should be its falsifiability. Indeed, Imre Lakatos repeatedly pointed out [2] that such a
demarcation criterion assumes that there are critical tests, which are able to conclusively falsify a
theory. History tells us that many operational test of a theory could be interpreted in one way or
the other—either as corroboration of a theory or as a falsification.
Moreover, a theory or research program in statu nascendi is almost always handicapped by a
badly developed formalism and most of the time lacks the experimental credentials of its soon-to-
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become predecessors. A historical example which is often mentioned is the Copernican system,
putting the earth in rotation around the sun, which was competing against the older Ptolemaic
system.
Sir Karl Raimund Popper himself has conceded these and other problems with the demarcation
criterion. And he seemed to have constantly revised and adapted the demarcation criterion to cope
with the historic facts.
One may quite justifiable ask if some principles of scientific conduct which claim to be able
to differentiate and decide between what is reasonable science and “blablabla,” itself should
not also satisfy the very principles it requires from proper science. In other words: is Sir Karl
Raimund Popper’s theory of induction a scientifically sound theory by its own standards, or mere
“blablabla?”
While I shall let the Reader decide the case, I would only like to mention my impression that
Sir Karl Raimund Popper seemed to have applied the same kind of “immunizing strategies” which
he blamed other “quasi-scientific” constructions to his own theories. In short, the demarcation
criterion may just be an ideology according to its own judgements, after all!
It is interesting to note that some of Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s very few and almost forgotten
early papers in physics (e.g., Refs. [9, 10, 11]) avoid concrete predictions and statements which
could be falsified. Should they therefore considered be as “blablabla?” I do not think so; they
contain highly original speculations about the consequences of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems
for physics.
If the demarcation criterion is an ideology, then the old Roman dictum “cui bono?” applies;
i.e., who are the losers and the winners? In more practical terms, almost every decision has a
financial component associated with it. To put it pointedly: if one omits the scientific content and
meaning of a decision for the time being, then a decision often boils down to money. If a wrong
or a misguided ideology is taken as a guideline for decision making such as funding policies, then
this boils down to a waste of (mostly taxpayer’s) money. Hence, Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s claim
to be able to draw a demarcation line between proper scientific conduct and pseudo-science may
not only impede the growth of knowledge, but may also be very costly.
However, as mentioned already, most of the practicing scientists, although paying lip service to
the principle of falsification, do not really care about it in their everyday operations. The following
anecdote may serve as an example. A physics department head once boldly stated, ‘if a student
comes to me with a new idea, I first ask the student if the idea is falsifiable, at least in principle.’ If
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not, he concluded, this idea had to be dismissed immediately (this seemed almost a relieve to him).
Fortunately, the researcher did not implemented the strategy just mentioned in his home institution.
Otherwise, more than one half of the ongoing research there would have to be abandoned.
Indeed, if the demarcation criterion would be implemented into theoretical physics, many ven-
erable research journals would have to stop publishing. And yet, “peer review,” with its assumed
benevolent censorship, or the formation of interests clusters and pressure groups (“gangs”) effec-
tively might do more harm and might be responsible for a bigger waste of (mostly taxpayer’s)
money than the demarcation criterion. This could be the topic of another article. Here, I would
only like to mention that I believe it is not totally unreasonable to try to utilize other forms of
evaluation of research than just “peer review,” in particular an implementation of the grand jury
system as it is already practiced in the courtrooms. This has been proposed by Paul Feyerabend,
yet another philosopher of science originating from Vienna. But I would also like to propose to
distribute a certain amount of money to research programs by a random selection, such as a lot-
tery throwing dices; with a post mortem evaluation of all three funding groups (peer review/jury
selected/randomly selected; maybe distributed by a 70:20:10 ratio).
My impression is that any kind of generally applicable demarcation criterion between proper
science and “pseudo-science” eventually will turn out to be a red herring. In the same category are
attempts to implement Occams razor as a criterion (c.f. the criticism by Daniel Greenberger [12]),
or the radical operationalism of the Percy Bridgman [13].
The question remains open why the thoughts of Sir Karl Raimund Popper have been so highly
appreciated. In my opinion, as far as politics is concerned, this esteem comes from the fact that he
fitted nicely into the scheme of liberal democracy at a time when western policy makers demanded
someone who would firmly stand against communism and for western liberal democratic values,
while at the same time had not the faintest touch of Nazism (such as, for instance, Heidegger and
Adorno). This may explain some of the fame of Sir Karl Raimund Popper in political circles.
But this cannot explain the high reputation among scientists, although he himself claimed not
to have been taken too seriously by his fellow colleagues in philosophy departments, contrary to
researchers in physics, medicine, biology and other natural sciences.—Maybe the former were too
sophisticated to agree and also suspicious what might remain of their own research after Sir Karl
Raimund Popper’s demarcation criterion had been applied to their subjects.
Maybe one should view much of Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s “so-
lutions to the problems of induction” as having a high marketing value: it may be wise to agree
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officially to these almost undeniable, self-evident statements, while at the same time pursuing
many other different goals, both politically and scientifically. Yet, I have to confess not having
found any convincing answer so far. The high appreciation Ludwig Wittgenstein (yet another Vi-
ennese philosopher) enjoyed in Cambridge is comparable, although this might be explained by
the “Nostradamus-like” style of his writings and expressions, which leaves open the doors for
many, even contradicting, interpretations, and which sometimes appears to be extremely attractive
to philosophers. If one considers Niels Bohr’s philosophical emanations on the interpretation of
quantum mechanics (and his discussions with Einstein and others on these issues), one is almost
inclined to enlarge this group to physicists as well.
Undoubtedly, many of Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s thoughts are insightful and prudent; for
instance when it comes to a radical revision of the university system, suggesting that the teaching
of students (in New Zealand and elsewhere) should be primarily based on the research spirit rather
than on grading ever larger numbers of students [14]—an old Humboldian approach which tends
to become forgotten and has to be emphasized over and over again. And I would have been
willing to write a more forgiving review (or none at all) of his theses if he would have been
more forgiving to his rivals and to the theories he considered to be “pseudo-science” or simply
“blablabla.” Unfortunately, this was not the case. And hence, critical remarks seem to be in order.
Let me conclude this very brief and necessarily incomplete appraisal of the works of Sir Karl
Raimund Popper with his statement, “all theories are hypotheses; all may be overthrown,” which
serves as an almost tautological motto to an exhibition advertised by the University of Vienna
in connection with its recent Karl Popper 2002 Centenary Congress. Or should one better recall
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s dictum, “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, daru¨ber muß man schweigen”
(“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”)?
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